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I. INTRODUCTION
The 'weapons' used by the peacekeeper in achieving his objec-
tives are those of negotiation, mediation, quiet diplomacy, tact
and the patience of Job - not the self-loading rifle.'
Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are concepts which have
their origins in the United Nations (UN) Charter. Among other things,
the UN Charter is based on principles of sovereignty, non-intervention
and the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Although
peacekeeping was not explicitly provided for in the Charter, it has
evolved since 1945 into a well-developed concept based on certain
agreed principles. With the end of the Cold War, the United Nations
has willingly taken on a new and more aggressive role as "peace en-
forcer." Iraq's aggression in Kuwait, for instance, was soundly met by
an international coalition of armed forces acting under the authority of
the UN. The humanitarian aspects of the Iraqi oppression of the Kurds
and the inability to supply food and assistance to starving Somalis have
also presented the UN with new challenges to its foundational princi-
ples of sovereignty and non-intervention.
As the fighting mounts in the former Yugoslavian republics, the
UN appears committed to settling the dispute diplomatically if possi-
ble, and by force if necessary. The propensity of the Security Council
to authorize humanitarian interventions, however, has led to an anom-
aly - peacekeepers, generally guided by the principle of neutrality and
traditionally limited to self-defense, are finding themselves in the more
aggressive role of peace enforcer. The dynamic nature of humanitarian
assistance operations has resulted in a gradually expanding mandate
for the peacekeepers' authority to use force. As their objectives change
and their authority to use force alters, peacekeeping missions are be-
coming increasingly less impartial and more assertive. The challenge is
for the peacekeeping forces to adapt to a more hazardous environment
without jeopardizing their safety while accomplishing their mission.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the full range of the use of
force under UN auspices in the context of the UN Charter and inter-
national law. Under the Charter, the UN has engaged in peacekeeping
and peace enforcement actions which have covered "the spectrum of
conflict."' At one end, the spectrum is peacekeeping, with little or no
1. INDAR JIT RIKHYE, PEACEKEEPING: APPRAISALS & PROPOSALS 6 (1983).
2. WILLIAM J. DURCH, THE EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING 4 (William J.
Durch ed., St. Martin's Press 1993).
PEACEKEEPING TO PEACE ENFORCEMENT
force beyond self-defense authorized and the full consent of the host
government. At the other end is a peace enforcement action such as the
Persian Gulf war, characterized by the use of "all necessary" force and
a total lack of consent by the local government to peacekeeping and
peace enforcement actions. This paper addresses the more obscure cir-
cumstances where an ostensibly neutral peacekeeping force finds itself
gradually engaged in the contentious role of peace enforcer as it pro-
gressively moves along the sliding scale of the spectrum.
After an initial introduction to the background of the UN, the
Charter and its principal norms, this paper will survey UN actions,
from serving as observers and armed peacekeepers to employing en-
forcement actions and humanitarian interventions, taking a historical
and political perspective. The paper will then examine the legal bases
and foundations for these operations, focusing on the legal norms di-
rectly from the Charter and "guiding principles" from the Charter in
practice, which have directed past operations. Because of the Security
Council's recent willingness to authorize humanitarian interventions,
the paper will also examine the legal development of these missions in
some detail, concentrating on the Council's expanded interpretation of
the Charter's Article 39 requirement of a "threat to the peace."
Using the present conflict in the former Yugoslav republics as a
model, the paper then will analyze the enforcement action in Bosnia-
Herzcegovina and examine the status of the Charter's norms and other
principles which have traditionally guided peacekeeping operations.
Lastly, the paper will discuss the peculiar situation which occurs when
the authorized use of force in a peacekeeping operation escalates be-
yond the traditional norm of self-defense and examines the UN's ongo-
ing efforts to address this problem.
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND OF THE UN CHARTER
For the purposes of this paper, it is useful to look at the twentieth
century efforts to establish 1) international organizations, 2) conven-
tions, and 3) military arrangements designed to create norms by which
force would be restricted.
A. Historical and Political Perspective
The belief that there was a need for a world organization to con-
trol the use of force originated from the destruction left in the wake of
World War I. Prior to 1919, the justifications for war had evolved from
1995]
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moral to legal bases.3 The emergence of the state as a political struc-
ture helped to create the idea that states had a sovereign right to go to
war lawfully. 4 The havoc wrought by the First World War convinced
the Great Powers of the time that an international structure was
needed to prevent similar crises in the future.
The League of Nations sought to protect the "territorial integrity
and existing political independence of" member states from "external
aggression" by developing detailed rules to define the circumstances
under which states could use force.5 The League devised procedures of
arbitration, judicial settlement and inquiry by the League Council to
reconcile disputes or "rupture(s)" between member states. Although
states could follow the decision of the Council, non-compliance by a
state with that decision allowed the affected state to resort to war after
a three-month waiting period. Likewise, the Council's failure to make a
decision would create no restrictions on a state's ability to resort to
war.
6
The League Covenant did not explicitly outlaw the total use of
force. A subsequent attempt to limit the right of states to go to war
was the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, ratified in
1929, renounced war "as an instrument of national policy" and "con-
demn[ed] recourse to war for the solution of . . . international poli-
cies." Although the Pact did not address the issue of the use of force
short of war, it did recognize that aggression was distinct from self-
defense. Generally, the parties to the Pact accepted that the use of
force was allowable in cases of self-defense.8 It will later be seen that
the Kellogg-Briand Pact was the precursor to Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter.
Although the Kellogg-Briand Pact did not prevent the Second
World War, the Allied nations quickly realized that an international
political infrastructure was necessary to govern international conflicts.
In San Francisco in April of 1945, the victorious Allied powers met
along with the delegates of 45 states to formulate the UN Charter.
The UN Charter was intended to provide rules which managed the
3. For a detailed discussion on the early history of the use of force and the moral
and legal reasons used to justify war, see A. C. AREND & R. J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 11-19 (Rutledge
1993) [hereinafter AREND].
4. Id. at 16-17.
5. Covenant of the League of Nations, art. 10.
6. AREND, supra note 3, at 19-20.
7. Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 26, 1928, art. 1, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
8. AREND, supra note 3, at 23.
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behavior of states towards each other. The primary purpose of the
Charter was to maintain international peace and security. Several
Charter provisions, discussed below, directly address conditions under
which the use of force is appropriate.
B. Legal Bases and Norms
We now turn to a discussion of the law as it relates to the full
spectrum of the use of force under the auspices of the UN. It first is
helpful to discuss the legal norms of international law which have
served as general principles which indicate how nations have treated
each other over the past fifty years. Due to the dynamic nature of this
subject, it is essential to look at the UN Charter, which has been de-
scribed as the "authoritative statement on the use of force," in light of
the subsequent practice of the member states in accordance with Arti-
cle 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.9
As noted above, the UN Charter has set forth the norms upon
which laws governing the use of force are based. Professor David
Scheffer has listed the principal norms of international law as state sov-
ereignty, the non-use of force, and non-intervention in internal affairs.1"
Professor Scheffer notes that these norms are "evolving"'" and reflect
the view that the Charter is a "flexible document."12
The norm of the "non-use of force," and to a lesser extent state
sovereignty,"3 is established in the UN Charter. Article 2(4) contains a
9. See Louis Henkin, The Use of Force.: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V.
MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 38 (Council on Foreign Rela-
tions Press, 1991) [hereinafter Henkin]. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, 8 I.L.M. 679. See also Vienna Convention on Treaties
Between States and International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, art. 31, 25 I.L.M. 543
(not in force).
10. David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention,
23 U. TOL. L. REV. 253, 259-64 (1992) [hereinafter Scheffer].
11. Id. at 259.
12. David J. Scheffer, Commentary on Collective Security, in LAW AND FORCE IN
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 103 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer,
eds., 1991) [hereinafter Scheffer II]. Professor Scheffer notes that the actions of the
international community during the Iraq-Kuwait crisis were proof that a "[n]arrow,
rigid interpretation of the Charter . . . may have the unintended result of creating
unnecessary obstacles to the effective implementation of critical Charter provisions."
Id. at 103-4.
13. Sovereignty, according to Professor Scheffer, is the "central pillar of interna-
tional law," and thus legitimized the nation-state as entitled to the protection of inter-
national law. The character of sovereignty, he asserts, is evolving as the state takes on
numerous obligations through international treaties and conventions, and is challenged
by international organizations and domestic ethnic groups. Scheffer, supra note 10, at
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prohibition on "the use of force against the territorial integrity or polit-
ical independence of any state," 14 providing: "All members shall re-
frain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations."
The Article is broader than the Kellogg-Briand Pact in that it pro-
hibits the use and the threat of use of force rather than just recourse to
war. Although Article 2(4) was first thought to outlaw the use of force
of any sort by one state against another, exceptions to the Article -
both explicit and implicit - were subsequently used to justify unilat-
eral interventions. 15 One exception expressly built into the Charter was
Article 51's recognition that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an
armed attack occurs against a Member. . ." and the enforcement ac-
tions authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII. 16 Implicit
exceptions to Article 2(4) have been derived from the Article. For in-
stance, an argument can be made that Article 2(4) prohibits only the
use of force against the "territorial integrity" or "political indepen-
dence" of another state, and would not apply to an intervention which
is not intended to withhold or even temporarily occupy the state's terri-
tory or to interfere with the state's political autonomy or sovereignty.
1 7
The condemnation by governments of almost every use of force
which has occurred since the signing of the UN Charter could lead to
the conclusion that Article 2(4) is restrictively interpreted. In fact, the
prohibition on the use of force would appear to have been enlarged by
259-60.
14. See also UN Charter, art. 2(3) ("All Members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered.").
15. Henkin, supra note 9, at 39.
16. One commentator has noted that the general prohibition of Article 2(4) on the
use of force is limited by three factors: (1) the reservation in Article 51 with respect to
self-defense;(2) expressed provisions of the Charter pertaining to collective measures of
force by member-states; and (3) the limitation of the word "force" in Article 2(4)
covering only armed or physical force. R. AMER, THE UNITED NATIONS AND FOREIGN
MILITARY INTERVENTIONS, 23 (Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala
University 1992).
Other exceptions in the Charter to Article 2(4) include Article 106's collective use
of force before the Security Council is functional and the Articles 107 and 53 use of
force against "enemy" states. AREND, supra note 3, at 31-32.
17. See Henkin, supra note 9, at 39-40. Professor Henkin points out that ques-
tions such as this could be effectively answered by the development of international law
by a court with "comprehensive jurisdiction and recognized authority." Id. at 40.
PEACEKEEPING TO PEACE ENFORCEMENT
the General Assembly's adoption of instruments designed to limit ag-
gression and armed intervention."8 States, however, have claimed that
use of force and intervention have been justified by numerous excep-
tions to Article 2(4). Some of the noted exceptions to the prohibition of
the use of force have included interventions to support self-determina-
tion, socialism (Brezhnev Doctrine), democracy (Reagan Doctrine) 9
and humanitarian interventions.2
As noted above, a primary exception in the Charter to the prohibi-
tion of the use of force is the enforcement action procedures contained
in Chapter VII. Article 42 expressly authorizes the Security Council to
take "action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security." There are three prerequi-
sites which must exist before an Article 42 procedure can be author-
ized. First, the Security Council must determine that a threat to peace,
breach of peace or act of aggression exists in accordance with Article
39. Article 39, though originally read rather narrowly, has taken new
meaning in the post-Cold War period. Before, the Security Council
only considered that Article 39 had been triggered by the actual use of
international military force with two exceptions." Recently, however,
the Council has determined that a threat to international peace and
security existed in the repression of Kurds in Iraq, the rampant starva-
tion in war-torn Somalia and the secession of the former republics of
Yugoslavia. This broader interpretation of Article 39 by the Security
Council has led to more liberal determinations of when a humanitarian
violation constitutes a threat to international peace and security.
The second prerequisite is that the Council should call on the par-
ties concerned to comply with provisional measures as the Council
18. For discussion of the General Assembly's adoption of The Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970), and the Defini-
tion of Aggression (1974) (both adopted by consensus). See Henkin, supra note 9, at
41.
19. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Merits, 1986 IJC 14 (Judgment of June 27) (ruling for the first time since the
Corfu Channel case on limits of the right of self-defense, the determination of what
constitutes an "armed attack" and the principle of non-intervention).
20. Henkin, supra note 9, at 41-44. Nothing in the Charter expressly prohibits
civil wars or internal revolutions. Id. at 42.
21. See Jost Delbruck, A More Effective International Law or a New "World
Law"?: Some Aspects of the Development of International Law in a Changing Interna-
tional System, 68 IND. L.J. 705, 707 (1993) [hereinafter Delbruck]. The Security
Council had found that a "threat to the peace" had been met by apartheid in South
Africa and by racism in Rhodesia. Id. at 708 n.14.
22. Id. at 707-10.
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deems necessary. Provisional measures usually include a cease-fire or
withdrawal. In accordance with Article 42, the Council must consider
that measures not involving the use of force in Article 41 "would be
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate" to satisfy the third condi-
tion. The Article 41 measures include economic embargoes, disruption
of communications and severance of diplomatic relations.28
In addition, Article 43 was included to provide for "special agree-
ments" by which nations would contribute armed forces to the Security
Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, and
Article 47 provided for a Military Staff Committee (MSC) to "advise
and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security
Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international
peace and security."24
It should be noted that the Charter in Chapter VIII recognizes
that regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO) or the Organization of American States (OAS) can
potentially perform a role in regional or international conflict manage-
ment as regulated by the Security Council. Article 52 empowers re-
gional organizations to deal with "matters relating to the maintenance
of international peace and security ... provided that such ... activities
are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."
Members are compelled to "make every effort to achieve pacific settle-
ment of local disputes." Article 53 requires that "no enforcement ac-
tion shall be taken under regional arrangements ...without the au-
thorization of the Security Council." While scholars agree that regional
organizations can use force in self-defense and pursuant to an enforce-
ment action authorized by the Security Council, others claim that uses
of force have proven more controversial.2 5
The principle of state sovereignty, long protected by the concept of
non-intervention into the domestic affairs of states, is both recognized
23. See Oscar Schachter, Authorized Uses of Forces by the United Nations and
Regional Organizations, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 67
(Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer, eds., 1991) [hereinafter Schachter].
24. See J. M. LEE, R. VON PAGENHARDT & T. W. STANLEY, To UNITE OUR
STRENGTH, ENHANCING THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE AND SECURITY SYSTEM 49-50
(University Press of America 1992) [hereinafter LEE].
25. AREND, supra note 3, at 61-62. When the OAS recommended action against
Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis, it was considered not to be a permissible enforce-
ment action because the Security Council had not authorized the action. Id. at 63. In
addition, the claim that regional organizations may intervene in civil wars to promote
self-determination has been hotly debated. Id. at 63-65. Cf. JOHN NORTON MOORE,
LAW AND THE GRENADA MISSION (1984).
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as customary international law and codified in the UN Charter." Arti-
cle 2(7) acknowledges that "[n]othing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." The article,
however, is limited by an exception which allows the "application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII."
Article 2(7) is a prohibition against the United Nations, not states,
from intervening in the internal affairs of member-states.27 However,
the principle of non-intervention has been eroded by the numerous in-
trusive treaty obligations to which states have committed themselves. 8
The large body of human rights law that has developed in conventional
and customary law has also contributed to the development of Article
2(7), which indicates that violations of internationally recognized stan-
dards are not always matters completely within the internal jurisdiction
of a member-state. This erosion of the principle of non-intervention set
forth by Article 2(7) has contributed, in part, to the increase in UN
interventions in the post-Cold War world, which in turn has occasion-
ally led to complex operations that include elements of both peacekeep-
ing and peace enforcement.
III. THE UN CHARTER AND PEACEKEEPING
The grand designs of the UN in the aftermath of World War II
were diminished by the emergence of the Cold War. The drafters of
the UN Charter expected that the UN would be summoned to confront
forces on the size and scale of the Second World War. The previously
mentioned articles were created to form a pre-arranged UN force that
would be available when needed by the Security Council. With the on-
set of the Cold War, this expectation quickly became unrealistic.29
Soviet fear of a U.S.-dominated Security Council led to the failure
of the five permanent members to agree on a collective security regime.
The MSC's incapacity to develop a military force "on call" for Secur-
ity Council action had two primary effects. The first was the advent of
numerous regional defense pacts such as the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. The second result was the
26. AREND, supra note 3, at 715.
27. See Vladimir Kartashkin, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention, in
LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 206 (Lori Fisler Damrosch &
David J. Scheffer, eds., 1991) [hereinafter Kartashkin].
28. Scheffer, supra note 10, at 262.
29. Richard Connaughton, Military Intervention and UN Peacekeeping, in To
LOOSE THE BANDS OF WICKEDNESS 171 (Nigel Rodley, ed., Brassey's (UK) 1992)
[hereinafter Connaughton].
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emergence of peacekeeping as a method of maintaining international
peace and security. 80
A. History and Background
Generally, peacekeeping can be separated into two categories: ob-
server missions and actual peacekeeping forces.3 1 One of the first
peacekeeping operations established by the Security Council was the
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which still
operates today. UNTSO was created to supervise the truce and Armi-
stice Agreements between the newly formed state of Israel and four of
her Arab neighbors in 1948-9. The observers were (and remain) un-
armed. Significantly, the observers operate only with the consent of the
parties. The observers' mission does not include enforcement of Agree-
ments or prevention of any violations of the truce. When complaints
arise, observers either settle the dispute on their own or report the com-
plaint through their chain of command to the Mediator, the senior
member of UNTSO. The Mediator could then report the complaint, at
his discretion, to the Secretary General and the Security Council. In
certain cases, the observers would initiate investigations as needed."2
One of the more recent peacekeeping operations similar to
UNTSO is the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission,
known as UNIKOM. UNIKOM, set up in the aftermath of the 1991
Persian Gulf War, was authorized by Security Council Resolution 689
to assist allied coalition forces in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in
withdrawing from Iraq.33 In accordance with the request of the Secre-
tary General's Report, UNIKOM's duties included the deterrence of
"violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of
the demilitarized zone; and to observe any hostile or potentially hostile
action mounted from the territory of one State to the other.""
UNIKOM, distinct from the Special Commissions that were created to
dismantle Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological warfare capacity and
30. LEE, supra note 24, at 46-47.
31. Id. at 72.
32. UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, THE BLUE HEL-
METS, A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING 18 U.N. DOC. DP1/1065,
Sales No. E.90.I.18 (1990) [hereinafter The Blue Helmets].
33. William J. Durch, The Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, in THE EVOLUTION
OF UN PEACEKEEPING 261 (William J. Durch ed., St. Martin's Press 1993) [hereinaf-
ter Durch].
34. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of
Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), Security Council Document
S/22454, April 5, 1991, 1.
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the forces over-flying northern and southern Iraq to protect the Kurds
and Shiites, was an unarmed peacekeeping force. The Mission's opera-
tions have been limited to observing activity and reporting violations in
the DMZ.385
The Suez conflict in 1956 provided the UN with its first opportu-
nity to deploy an armed peacekeeping force. The first United Nations
Emergency Force (UNEF I) set the precedent for funding, logistics
and command structures for future peacekeeping forces. UNEF's pri-
mary mandates under General Assembly Resolution 1000 were to se-
cure a cease-fire between British, French, Israeli and Egyptian forces in
the Sinai Peninsula; to direct the withdrawal of the non-Egyptian
forces from Egyptian territory; and to patrol the border areas. In addi-
tion, the Emergency Force was responsible for trying to achieve the
aims of the Egypt-Israeli Armistice Agreement.3 6 The Secretary Gen-
eral, Dag Hammarskjold, indicated that he wanted to ensure that the
Emergency Force "was in no way a military force temporarily control-
ling the territory in which it was stationed."'3 7 UNEF troops, while
more than just observers, were clearly intended to be deployed for
peaceful purposes alone.
An essential - and at the time, unique - feature of UNEF I was
the broad political support which it received from all parties to the con-
flict, including the superpowers. The Secretary General was able to se-
cure "good faith" agreements from President Nasser of Egypt regard-
ing the activities of UNEF and thus, Nasser's consent to allowing the
force to operate in Egyptian territory while recognizing Egypt's na-
tional sovereignty. The United States and Soviet Union, seeking to
avoid a direct confrontation in the conflict, were eager to arrange a
cease fire and establish the Emergency Force. 38 The British and
French, widely condemned for the attack and wishing to clear the Suez
Canal in order to import oil, agreed to remove their forces and to rec-
ognize the UNEF's mandate. The Israelis, while not allowing UN
troops on Israeli soil, also reluctantly observed the Resolutions.89
UNEF deployed to the area as the British and French troops with-
drew from the Suez Canal territory. The Emergency Force oversaw the
withdrawal of Israeli forces, which was delayed until March 1957.
35. Durch, supra note 33, at 267.
36. Mona Ghali, United Nations Emergency Force I, in THE EVOLUTION OF UN
PEACEKEEPING 112-13 (William J. Durch, ed., 1993) [hereinafter Ghali].
37. The Blue Helmets, supra note 32, at 48.
38. Ghali, supra note 36, at 110-11. The Soviets were preoccupied with violent
anti-communist student demonstrations in Hungary at the time. Id. at ill.
39. Id. at 112.
1995]
12 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 19
UNEF continued to patrol the border frontier until Egypt rescinded its
consent to the Force's presence in May 1967.40
A larger and potentially more dangerous deployment of UN
peacekeepers occurred when the UN established the Operation in the
Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1964. Originally, ONUC was set up to
defuse the separatist civil war taking place in the recently decolonized
Congo. Belgium, the former colonial power, was required to remove her
troops from the Congo under the UN's mandate. The complex political
situation in the area resulted in the granting of vague responsibilities to
the peacekeeping force. There was no authorized use of force, except in
self-defense."1 Although not deployed for the purpose of initiating any
use of force, ONUC's mandate included assisting the Congolese gov-
ernment with the restoration of law and order. After the central gov-
ernment disintegrated and attacks on UN personnel took place in Feb-
ruary 1961, the Security Council authorized ONUC to "take
immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil
war in the Congo, including . . .the use of force, if necessary, in the
last resort."'42 ONUC's mandate was again expanded in November
1961 when the Security Council authorized ONUC troops to use force
to remove foreign mercenaries who were fighting alongside Congolese
forces.' 3 In addition, the ONUC troops were authorized to have free
movement throughout the Congo." By January 1963, ONUC troops
numbered nearly 20,000, including fighter jets from Sweden, Iran, and
Italy." The UN troops, under the rationale of securing their freedom
of movement, had advanced to Elizabethville in Katanga and success-
fully prevented a Katangan secession.'
B. Law and Practice
As explained above, peacekeeping is a United Nations non-en-
forcement action which is not expressly delineated by the UN Charter.
Since the signing of the Charter in 1945, there have been twenty-six
distinct UN peacekeeping operations - thirteen during the Cold War
40. Id. at 119. The UNEF troops withdrew at the request of the Egyptian govern-
ment in accordance with a good faith agreement. Withdrawal of the forces was a pre-
cursor, though not a cause, of the Six Day War. Id. at 127.
41. The Blue Helmets, supra note 32, at 220.
42. G.A. Res. 161, U.N. SCOR, (1961).
43. G.A. Res. 169, U.N. SCOR, (1961).
44. See The Blue Helmets, supra note 32, at 250.
45. William J. Durch, The UN Operation in the Congo, in THE EVOLUTION OF
UN PEACEKEEPING 336 (William J. Durch, ed., 1993) [hereinafter Durch II].
46. Id. at 344.
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(1945-1985) and thirteen operations afterward (1985-present).' 7 Al-
though peacekeeping operations have been functionally used for many
different purposes,4 the legal basis for the concept was a matter of
debate from the beginning.
A basic argument first arose out of a strict reading of the Charter.
Some argued that the only authorized use of military force under the
Charter was in Article 42 and Chapter VII. An ancillary claim was
that the Charter in Article 43 provided the only basis for establishing
these military forces. However, those in favor of initiating peacekeeping
missions contended that this proposed use of military units was not for
enforcement purposes. The proposed use, thus, fell outside the scope of
Chapter VII. Originally, the UN Secretary General proposed that a
UN guard be set up to protect UN missions around the globe.' The
Secretary General justified this proposition under Articles 97, 98 and
100 of the Charter, which all refer to the organization of the UN Sec-
retariat and the Secretary General's powers to develop a staff. The re-
sulting resolution from the General Assembly created the UN Field
Service, a precursor to later peacekeeping proposals, which assisted
field missions and provided a certain amount of security.50
The early peacekeeping missions, which involved unarmed observ-
ers, were impliedly authorized by the Security Council under Articles
24 and 36. These articles provide for procedures of the Security Coun-
cil on "the settlement of dispute[s]." The legal authority for the UNEF
and ONUC operations, however, was a subject of great controversy.
When the Soviet Union and France refused to pay their apportioned
dues for those missions, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had an
opportunity to issue an advisory opinion on the legality of withholding
the funds, as well as on the overall lawfulness of peacekeeping opera-
tions. In the Certain Expenses Case,"1 the ICJ ruled that Article 14
empowered both the Security Council and the General Assembly to
47. DURCH, supra note 2, at 7-11. For a comprehensive list of the operations and
more in-depth study of peacekeeping history, operations, politics and funding, see id.;
and The Blue Helmets, supra note 32.
48. Some commentators have simply separated the operations into two categories
- observer groups and military contingents. See AREND, supra note 3, at 66. But see
Schachter, supra note 23, at 80 (classifying peacekeeping operations into eight
groupings).
49. This proposal was made shortly after the assassination of Count Bernadotte,
the UN Mediator in Palestine. Schachter, supra note 23, at 81.
50. Id.
51. "Certain Expenses of the United Nations," 1962 IJC 151 (advisory opinion of
20 July 1962).
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authorize peacekeeping operations. 2 Significantly, the ICJ rejected the
view that Article 43 agreements were required to establish the
peacekeeping forces and found that the operations were not "coercive
or enforcement action[s]" which would require Security Council au-
thorization.58 The Court noted that the Security Council commenced
missions "at the request, or with the consent, of the States con-
cerned."5 4 Based on the ICJ's opinion, commentators have generally
agreed that authority for peacekeeping operations is contained in both
Chapter VI and Chapter VII, or as Dag Hammarskjold quipped,
"Chapter VI and a half."55
The early peacekeeping campaigns had several elements or "guid-
ing principles" in common which led to their operational success.5 6
First, the UN operations had the political support, or at least acquies-
cence, of the five permanent members of the Security Council, particu-
larly the United States, which was the principal financier of the opera-
tions.5 7 Second, the consent and cooperation of the local parties to the
dispute was seen as essential to the deployment of the UN
peacekeepers.58 For example, the mandate of ONUC was seriously
frustrated after the Congolese government collapsed in September
1960. As such, peacekeepers were considered distinct from troops in an
52. UN Charter art. 14 provides that "the General Assembly may recommend
measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it
deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations." The
ICJ's holding in Certain Expenses of the United Nations was significant in that the
Security Council, hampered by French and British vetoes in the Suez situation and
paralyzed by a Soviet veto in the Congo crisis, was unable to take action. The General
Assembly eventually debated both issues and recommended, rather than demanded,
that states take action. AREND, supra note 3, at 67.
53. Id.
54. Certain Expenses at 164. See Schachter, supra note 23, at 82.
55. Connaughton, supra note 29, at 174. See also Schachter, supra note 23, at 82.
The author would distinguish the Congo operation as Chapter VII-authorized even
though not an enforcement action per se.
56. The term "guiding principles" is borrowed from the "Concept and Guiding
Principles" devised by Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold for the UNEF I forces.
See The Blue Helmets, supra note 32, at 47-48. The principles in this paper were not
initially penned by the Secretary General, but reflect precepts which have developed
through subsequent peacekeeping operations.
57. See Connaughton, supra note 29, at 171. The author suggests that a "basic
understanding" has also been that the peacekeeping troops are not drawn from the
permanent members of the Security Council. See also Nikolai Krylov, International
Peacekeeping and Enforcement Actions After the Cold War, in LAW AND FORCE IN
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 97 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer, eds.,
1991) [hereinafter Krylov].
58. Schachter, supra note 23, at 84.
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enforcement action and were limited to "proportionate and necessary"
self-defense."9 Third, the neutrality or independence of the UN was a
primary factor in an effective peacekeeping operation. ° Again, when
ONUC began to take an enforcement role in place of the central gov-
ernment, attacks on the UN force occurred and the UN's mandate ap-
peared blurred at best and biased at worst. These "guiding principles"
have come to distinguish peacekeeping operations in the "spectrum of
conflict" from more aggressive enforcement actions.
Likewise, the use of force in peacekeeping operations has always
officially been limited to self-defense. Professor Oscar Schachter, how-
ever, has pointed out that self-defense has been interpreted broadly in
order to suit the circumstances of the particular operation. For in-
stance, although the ONUC forces were originally authorized to use
force only if attacked, the Congo mandate included the maintenance of
law and order. 6 In addition, as Professor Schachter has noted,
ONUC's free movement throughout the Congo enabled the UN force
to control strategic parts of the Congo and, ultimately to prevent the
secession of Katanga. 62 The concept of self-defense, as well as the prin-
ciples of non-intervention and sovereignty, were loosely defined and
greatly modified in the Congo operation.
While peacekeepers today continue to heed to the principle of self-
defense, the size and complex mandate of operations such as those in
northern Iraq and former Yugoslavia have again blurred the strict
"neutrality and impartiality" of these operations.
IV. THE UN CHARTER AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT
A. History and Background
Unlike peacekeeping, the concept of peace enforcement had its ex-
59. Schachter, supra note 23, at 84-86. The concepts of "necessity and propor-
tionality" are borrowed from the Caroline case, which recognized that the "necessity of
self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment
of deliberation." AREND, supra note 3, at 18. See also Connaughton, supra note 29, at
172-73.
60. Lee, supra note 24, at 78.
61. See also The Blue Helmets, supra note 32, at 267. The United Nations Secur-
ity Force was set up primarily as an "internal law and security force" to monitor the
transition of the administration of West New Guinea (West Irian) from the Nether-
lands to Indonesia. The United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)
was also created in West New Guinea with a broad mandate that included appointing
government officials, legislating for the territory and guaranteeing civil liberties and
property rights. Id. at 270.
62. Schachter, supra note 23, at 84-85.
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plicit origins in the UN Charter under Chapter VII, as noted above.
Security Council authority to use force under the Charter has been
primarily limited to two different types of collective uses of force: en-
forcement actions and humanitarian interventions.
1. Enforcement Actions
The first occasion on which the UN Security Council authorized
the use of force in a military enforcement action was in June 1950
after North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea.
The Security Council met on June 25 to note that "the armed attack
on the Republic of Korea by the forces from North Korea ... consti-
tutes a breach of the peace" in accordance with Article 39 of the Char-
ter.63  Two days later, the Security Council in Resolution 83
"[r]ecommend[ed] that the Members of the United Nations furnish
such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel
the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the
area."64 Unable to utilize the MSC to direct the military action, the
Council established a unified military command with an American
commander who reported to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the President.65
Although the Korean enforcement action was the first time that
the UN authorized Chapter VII use of force, it must be noted that
these resolutions mention neither Chapter VII nor Article 42. The reso-
lutions also were not binding decisions, but rather were recommenda-
tions.66 Lastly, the UN was able to act in this situation, in the middle
of the Cold War, due to the chance absence of the Soviet Union from
the Security Council during the time-frame of these resolutions. 67
The end of the Cold War provided the Security Council with the
means to authorize the use of force in a large scale enforcement action
for the second time. After Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the
Security Council quickly condemned the action and demanded the im-
mediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq's forces. 6  On August 6,
the Council imposed economic sanctions on Iraq, "[a]cting under
63. United Nations Security Council Resolution 82 (June 25, 1950).
64. United Nations Security Council Resolution 83 (June 27, 1950).
65. United Nations Security Council Resolution 84 (July 7, 1950). See Schachter,
supra note 23, at 72.
66. AREND, supra note 3, at 53.
67. Id. The Soviet delegation was absent from Security Council meetings in pro-
test of the seating of Taiwan at the Security Council in the place of the People's Re-
public of China. Id. at 52.
68. United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 (Aug. 2, 1990).
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Chapter VII of the Charter." 9 In response to Iraq's subsequent claim
that it had annexed Kuwait, the Security Council, on August 25, au-
thorized the deployment of naval forces to enforce the sanctions of Res-
olution 661 by using "such measures commensurate to the specific cir-
cumstances as may be necessary . . . to halt all inward and outward
maritime shipping....
The United States during this time argued that the interdiction
efforts were justified as an act of collective self-defense of Kuwait, and
that Security Council authority was not necessary.71 In either case, the
Security Council took action to authorize the maritime interdiction op-
erations as well as to authorize, as of November 1990, member states
"to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660..
. and to restore international peace and security in the area."7 The
allied coalition forces which liberated Kuwait acted pursuant to the
Chapter VII authorization of Resolution 678. Unlike the Korean ac-
tion, there was no formal UN command. The coalition of independent
allied forces operated under the leadership of an American commander
with Saudi Arabia serving as the host country."
The liberation of Kuwait was the first time that all five permanent
members of the Security Council authorized the collective use of force
to repel an act of aggression. One commentator has noted that Resolu-
tion 678 was an authorization pursuant to Article 42, not a command.
In addition, the language of the resolution which was addressed to
"Member States co-operating with the government of Kuwait" seems
to follow the United States' view that the forces were acting under Ar-
ticle 51 in collective defense of Kuwait.7 4
With increasing political cooperation between all of the permanent
members of the Security Council, the UN is, more than ever in its brief
history, now in a position to address political situations which threaten
international peace and security. From a study of the actions in Korea
and the Persian Gulf, it would appear that the UN is most likely to
take action where there is large scale aggression by one state against
another state and where the vital interests of at least some of the per-
69. United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 (Aug. 6, 1990).
70. United Nations Security Council Resolution 665 (Aug. 25, 1990).
71. See AREND, supra note 3, at 54.
72. United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
73. LEE, supra note 24, at 80.
74. Abram Chayes, The Use of Force in the Persian Gulf in LAW AND FORCE IN
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 10 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds.,
1991) [hereinafter Chayes].
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manent members of the Security Council are at stake. 5 Departures
from this view have recently been seen in cases where states under the
authority of the UN have justified their use of force on the basis of
humanitarian violations.
2. Humanitarian Interventions
The principle of "non-intervention" in the domestic or internal af-
fairs of states is grounded in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter.", In the
past, humanitarian intervention had been defined as "the use of armed
force by a state (or states) to protect citizens of the target state from
large-scale human rights violations .... " Although the UN Charter
never explicitly mentions the use of force for humanitarian purposes,
recent relief operations in northern Iraq and Somalia have been author-
ized by the UN to protect fundamental human rights.
After the defeat of Iraq's army by the coalition forces in February
of 1991, Saddam Hussein's military began to stage attacks on the
populations in northern and southern Iraq in order to quell uprisings
against his regime. The Kurds of northern Iraq had been seeking au-
tonomy in the region for decades. As recently as 1988, the Kurds had
been attacked with chemical weapons by Saddam's regime.78 The
memory of the prior attack and the severity of the present onslaught
led nearly two million Kurds to leave the region, fleeing into Turkey
and Iran. When the Kurds were denied entrance into Turkey, many
remained in the inhabitable mountains of northern Iraq. There were
reports of nearly 1000 deaths each day.79
On April 5, 1991, at the behest of Turkey and France, the Secur-
ity Council adopted Resolution 688 which "condemn[ed] the repression
of the Iraqi civilian population" and "[d]emand[ed] that Iraq ... im-
75. See Paul Fifoot, Functions and Powers, and Inventions: UN Action in Respect
of Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention, in To LOOSE THE BANDS OF WICK-
EDNESS 149 (Nigel S. Rodley ed., 1992) [hereinafter Fifoot], where the author distin-
guishes Chapter VII actions in which the Security Council has authorized the use of
force from those in which it has not, as in the Falklands.
76. For an elaborate discussion of the academic definitions of the term "interven-
tion," see AMER, supra note 16, at 9-20.
77. AREND, supra note 3, at 113.
78. Lawrence Freedman & David Boren, 'Safe Havens' for Kurds in Post-War
Iraq, in To LOOSE THE BANDS OF WICKEDNESS: INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN
DEFENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 44-45 (Nigel S. Rodley, ed., 1992) [hereinafter Freed-
man]; See Howard Adelman, Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of the Kurds, 4
INT'L. J. REF. L. 4, 4-8 (1992) [hereinafter Adelman] for a brief history of the Kurdish
struggle in the region, particularly with the Iraqi regime.
79. Freedman, supra note 78, at 48.
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mediately end this repression .. -80 The portion of the Resolution
which has been described as "interventionist" is contained in the third
paragraph where the Security Council "[i]nsists that Iraq allow imme-
diate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in
need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all neces-
sary facilities for their operations." '81 What became known as the "Safe
Havens" operation began with the deployment of unarmed guards on
May 19, 1991 and the deployment of lightly armed guards on May 20,
1991. Allied troops began to build camps for the Kurds so that they
would return from the mountains of northern Iraq. By May 23, Iraq
had formally agreed to the operation." At the height of the operation,
over 21,000 American, British and French troops were deployed to the
region."3
The debate in the Security Council over Resolution 688 indicated
that the Resolution was controversial. Both Yemen and China argued
that the intervention based on humanitarian grounds contravened the
principle laid out in Article 2(7) and would lead to a "dangerous prece-
dent." ' 4 Supporters of the resolution pointed to the threat to interna-
tional peace and security which emanated from the "transboundary im-
pact" of a mass exodus of refugees into other states. Supporters also
emphasized the humanitarian nature of the operation. 5 Although there
is no mention of Chapter VII in the resolution, one commentator has
noted that the use of the word "demand" in reference to terminating
repression indicates that the Security Council was acting pursuant to
its decision-making authority under that chapter.86 In any event, Reso-
lution 688 dictated that Iraq forgo its right to territorial integrity and
allow the allies to go into the country to set up the relief operation
without the consent of the host state.
The overthrow of President Said Barre in January of 1991 by
combatting rival factions, and the resulting lack of an effective govern-
ment in Somalia, set the stage for a UN-authorized humanitarian relief
80. United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 (Apr. 5, 1991).
81. Id. See Nigel S. Rodley, Collective Intervention to Protect Human Rights and
Civilian Populations: The Legal Framework, in To LOOSE THE BANDS OF WICKEDNESS
31 (Nigel S. Rodley ed., 1992) [hereinafter Rodley].
82. Rodley, supra note 81, at 33.
83. Freedman, supra note 78, at 63.
84. Rodley, supra note 81, at 29. Yemen voted against the resolution while China
abstained, expressing concern about "taking action on questions concerning the internal
affairs of any State." Id.
85. Id. at 30. The French coined the onslaught and subsequent refugee situation
as a "crime against humanity." Id.
86. Id. at 31.
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effort in that country. Civil war in Somalia prevented the transport of
food and humanitarian aid to millions of starving Somalis. By January
of 1992, the situation had deteriorated to such a degree that the Secur-
ity Council unanimously enacted a weapons embargo on the country.8"
As the year progressed, the Security Council sent a team to observe the
administration of humanitarian aid and deployed fifty UN observers
through the creation of the United Nations Operation in Somalia or
UNOSOM.88 The situation, however, continued to worsen.
By the summer of 1992, invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
the Security Council increased the troop levels of the UNOSOM
peacekeepers and approved the transport of humanitarian aid through
airlifts.89 Citing violence against relief workers, the Secretary General,
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, called upon the Security Council to take action
under Article 42 of the Charter. In November 1992, after the United
States offered to lead a military operation in order to deliver humanita-
rian aid to the Somalis, the Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 794. The resolution "authoriz[ed] the Secretary-General
and Member States cooperating to .. .use all necessary means to es-
tablish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief
operations in Somalia."' ' 0 Based on this resolution, the United States
sent a large armed force contingent into Somalia.
The Security Council's mandate to use force was unique as the
operation was not in response to an act of aggression. The catalyst for
the explicit action under Chapter VII was an Article 39 determination
that the humanitarian situation in Somalia and the continuing civil war
constituted a threat to international peace and security.91 In addition,
Somalia was without a competent government to consent to the UN
sponsored intervention because the country was ravaged by rival war
factions.
B. Law and Practice
Enforcement actions under Chapter VII, such as those in Korea
and Iraq, are clearly permissible under the Charter when authorized by
the Security Council. Although legal concerns within Chapter VII
87. United Nations Security Council Resolution 733 (Jan. 23, 1992).
88. Mark R. Hutchinson, Note, Restoring Hope: U.N. Security Council Resolu-
tions for Somalia and an Expanded Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 34 HARV.
INT'L. L.J. 624, 627 (1993) [hereinafter Hutchinson].
89. United Nations Security Council Resolution 775 (Aug. 28, 1992).
90. United Nations Security Council Resolution 794 (Dec. 3, 1992).
91. See AREND, supra note 3, at 55-56; Hutchinson, supra note 88, at 632.
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abound, such as the authority of states to go beyond the mandate of a
particular Security Council resolution, precisely stated objectives would
remedy these problems.92
However, a succinct legal issue with regard to enforcement actions
and, particularly humanitarian interventions, is whether the Article 39
finding of a "threat to the peace" has been made. One author has noted
that, based on UN practice, any legitimate intervention for the purpose
of protecting human rights must have transboundary effects and the
violation must be "grave and systematic." 9 This distinction between
"external" international threats and "internal" domestic humanitarian
violations has become the subject of scholarly debate, with regard to
the legal threshold of Article 39 determinations.
The transboundary impact of a humanitarian violation is easier to
gauge than the measurement of a violation's severity. The refugee
problem which was created in Iraq by the exodus of the Kurds gave the
Security Council some leeway in determining that a threat to interna-
tional peace and security existed.9 Professor Scheffer points out that,
throughout history, internal conflicts and disasters have typically had
external regional or international impacts. He lists the results of these
"events" as including mass migrations of refugees, expanding armed
conflicts when a domestic struggle "spills" across the border and
problems with the availability and distribution of resources.9 5 It is also
believed that the greater emphasis that is now placed on human rights
will give constructive "transboundary effect" to certain gross viola-
tions.98 The Security Council's expanded interpretation of what consti-
tutes a threat to the peace now includes severe humanitarian viola-
92. See Schachter, supra note 23, at 73-74. Professor Schachter discusses the aca-
demic debate which occurred during the Iraqi invasion. The debate focused on whether
coalition states could exceed the bounds of the Security Council's resolution and at-
tempt to remove Iraqi leadership. This was a fundamental issue in the Korean war
when General MacArthur planned to chase North Korean troops into Communist
China. The debate in the Korean War centered on whether the aims of UN forces were
to restore the status quo (remove North Korean troops from South Korea) or to force
Korea to unify. The adversaries eventually agreed on the former. Id.
93. Rodley, supra note 81, at 34.
94. Id.
95. Scheffer, supra note 10, at 287. Professor Scheffer lists the examples of these
recent tragedies in notes 139-41. He also mentions the increased transboundary ten-
sions created by the re-emergence of claims of ethnic minority rights in Eastern Europe
after the Cold War.
96. Rodley, supra note 81, at 35. Professor Rodley quotes the April 1991 speech
of then Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: "[W]e have probably reached a stage in
the ethical and psychological evolution of Western civilization in which the massive and
deliberate violation of human rights will no longer be tolerated." Id.
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tions. 97 As the peacekeeping/ peace enforcement operations blend
together in humanitarian interventions, it is important to see how these
interventions have evolved.
Proponents of humanitarian intervention point to UN Articles 1,
55 and 56 to demonstrate the Charter's emphasis on the protection of
human rights as well as the maintenance of international peace and
security. 98 Several norms in international human rights law have
emerged since the signing of the UN Charter. While certain efforts
have been aimed towards general human rights at a universal level,99
others have been intended to protect against specific abuses including
genocide, 100 war crimes and crimes against humanity, 10 1 slavery,1
0 2
traffic in persons, 103 forced labor, 1'0 and torture. 0 5 These are generally
human rights crimes which, if violated, would potentially threaten in-
ternational peace and security. 0 6 In addition, apartheid is a human
97. AREND, supra note 3, at 133-34. See also Scheffer, supra note 10, at 254-58
for a comprehensive history of humanitarian interventions from the early nineteenth
century to the present.
98. AREND, supra note 3, at 132.
99. These conventions include the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights,
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1966 Covenant
on Economic and Social Rights, and the Optional Protocol to the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, which have been grouped together and labelled the
international bill of rights. CLAUDE AND WESTON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY (Richard P. Claude & Burns H. Weston eds., 2d ed. 1992); See Adelman,
supra note 78, at 13. See also Delbruck, supra note 21, at 714.
100. International conventions that recognize genocide as an international crime
include The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 278. Kartashkin, supra note 27, at 207.
101. The war crimes tribunals which followed the Second World War identified
certain fundamental obligations, the violations of which were termed "crimes against
humanity." See The 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limita-
tions to War Crimes and Crime Against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73.
102. See Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253; Protocol of
Amendment to the Slavery Convention, Dec. 7, 1953, 212 U.N.T.S. 18; and Supple-
mentary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and
Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 4.
103. See Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Ex-
ploitation of the Prostitution of Others, March 21, 1950, 96 U.N.T.S 272.
104. See ILO Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28,
1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55; and ILO Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of
Forced Labor, June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291.
105. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, U.N.G.A. Res. 39/46, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp
(No. 51) 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984).
106. Kartashkin, supra note 27, at 207. See also Delbruck, supra note 21, at 713-
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rights violation which has triggered Article 39 Security Council
action."' 7
In practice, the principle of non-intervention as articulated in Arti-
cle 2(7) has been applied less restrictively as the Charter has evolved.
For instance, in the early days of the UN, long before the interventions
in Somalia and northern Iraq, the General Assembly passed judgments
on matters relating to human rights with respect to the apartheid poli-
cies in South Africa'018 and human rights in Eastern European states. 10
The General Assembly tended to view isolated violations of human
rights as within the domestic jurisdiction of the member state while
regarding the denial of human rights to an entire population as within
the Assembly's purview. 1 0 This policy continued even as numerous de-
colonized states entered the UN, the Cold War struggle lingered on,
and human rights conventions came into effect. While the principle of
non-intervention certainly exists today, it has been weakened by the
norms and conventions cited as well as the growing idea that through
collective UN authorization, governments have the right to "intervene"
when a human rights violation might threaten international peace."' In
addition, there has developed a norm that member. states of the UN
have the responsibility to ensure that human rights violations in other
states are addressed."12 The forcible interventions into Somalia and
northern Iraq support this idea.
Consequently, international law relating to the use of force under
authority of the United Nations has evolved with the practice of the
Security Council during interventions in Iraq and Somalia, and more
recently, former Yugoslavia. The crises reflect ongoing tensions be-
tween the UN Charter norms of territorial integrity and non-interven-
107. Kartashkin, supra note 27, at 207. See also The 1973 International Conven-
tion on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.
108. See GAOR Res. 44 (I) (1946).
109. See GAOR Res. 272 (III) (1949) and GAOR Res. 385 (V) (1950).
110. A. Cassesse, The General Assembly: Historical Perspective 1945-1989, in
THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 33-34 (Philip Alston, ed., 1992)[hereinaf-
ter Cassesse].
111. B. G. Ramcharan, Strategies for the International Protection of Human
Rights in the 1990s, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY, ISSUES AND Ac-
TION 275 (Richard P. Claude & Burns H. Weston, eds., 1992)[hereinafter
Ramcharan].
112. Id. See Scheffer, supra note 10, at 275-81. Scheffer contends that the global
geo-political changes following the end of the Cold War, in addition to organizational
developments in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organiza-
tion of American States and the European Community, have all brought about a
marked change in the attitudes of governments to humanitarian interventions. Id.
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tion and the growing development of humanitarian intervention.11 Hu-
manitarian interventions have thus taken on a new role in collective
international use of force with the cultivation of human rights law and
the recent practice of the UN. As will be examined in the next section,
the Security Council's authorization to use force, in part to combat the
"widespread and flagrant" violations of international humanitarian law,
has resulted in the gradual obfuscation of peacekeeping and peace en-
forcement missions.114 Peacekeepers, generally trained in the ways of
self-defense and non-violent reaction, are increasingly confronted with
hostile local parties as their missions come to resemble enforcement
actions.
Some clarification on the use of force under UN auspices was pro-
vided with the June 1992 publication of the Secretary General's An
Agenda for Peace.11 5 The publication was intended to be "an analysis
and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more effi-
cient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity
of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and
for peace-keeping." 1 6 The Secretary General ultimately reaffirmed the
viability of Article 2(7) and cited the principle that "humanitarian as-
sistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of human-
ity, neutrality and impartiality; that the sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity and national unity of states must be fully respected ... and should
be provided with the consent of the affected country.11 17 In addition,
113. See PETER MALANCZUK, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE LEGITI-
MACY OF THE USE OF FORCE 12 (Het Spinhuis 1993).
114. The operation in Somalia was an indication of what can happen when the
peacekeeper/peacemaker mandate and authority are blurred. Originally sent into
Somalia in December of 1992 as a traditional peacekeeping mission to "establish a
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations" under the authority of Chapter
VII, the UNOSOM force's mission was expanded to a "peace enforcement" role within
months. By October 1993, 17 Americans had been killed and the Clinton administra-
tion eventually announced the intention to withdraw Americans participating in
UNOSOM by March 31, 1994. John R. Bolton, Wrong Turn in Somalia, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 1994 at 65.
115. An Agenda for Peace. Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeep-
ing: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/47/277, 17 June 1992 reprinted in
31 I.L.M. 956 [hereinafter Agenda for Peace].
116. Id. at para. 1.
117. Id. at para. 30, citing General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 19 December
1991. See T. G. Weiss, Intervention, Whither the United Nations?, in THE WASHING-
TON QUARTERLY, Jan., 1994 at 106, [hereinafter Weiss], where the author argues that
Boutros-Ghali, while affirming "conventional notions" about state sovereignty, presents
all of the reasons for eroding the concept, ultimately missing the opportunity to ad-
vance the idea of humanitarian intervention as a "routine part" of UN operations. Id.
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the Secretary General suggested that the time was ripe "to make
armed forces, assistance and facilities available to the Security Coun-
cil" in suggesting the creation of "peace-enforcement units." 118
The Secretary General recognized the need to adhere to the Char-
ter's norms and the "guiding principles" in peacekeeping operations, as
well as the interplay of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. He failed,
however, to devise specific plans or to implement particular solutions
for a situation where the authorized use of force for peacekeepers sud-
denly extends beyond the conventional meaning of self-defense and the
forces slide futilely along the "spectrum of conflict."
V. ANALYSIS - THE BOSNIA MODEL
The present situation in the former Yugoslavian republics presents
the UN with a challenge which will test both the organization's ability
to flexibly respond to a rapidly growing conflict and the efficacy of non-
traditional peacekeeping operations. The crisis, which has progressively
escalated since 1991, is an example of the inherent dangers that the
UN will face in a dynamic "spectrum of conflict" where peacekeeping
gradually merges into peace enforcement. To fully analyze these issues,
it is necessary to first look at the history of the current dispute.
A. History and Background
The recent conflict in former Yugoslavia was aggravated in De-
cember 1990 when Slovenians voted for independence by referendum.
The day before, the Croatian Parliament had declared that its law was
supreme over federal law. The resulting negotiations for a looser feder-
ation of states failed when the Serbian party, representing the domi-
nant Yugoslav republic, walked out of the talks. Despite threats from
the Serbs, Croatia and Slovenia declared independence on June 25,
1991. Within days, the central republic's military (JNA) attacked the
Slovenian provisional militia. By August, the conflict had spilled over
into widespread fighting in Croatia.
The UN Security Council convened in September at the request of
several states, including Yugoslavia (consisting of the former republics
of Serbia and Montenegro).' 19 It is interesting to note that due to the
118. Agenda for Peace, supra note 115, at para. 44.
119. Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L. 569, 577-79. The Security Coun-
cil debate was heavily influenced by the fact that Yugoslavia had requested the Coun-
cil's involvement, thus avoiding claims by Council members that Article 2(7) was being
contravened. Id.
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internal nature of the conflict, there was no suggestion that a violation
of Article 2(4) or any "international act of aggression" had oc-
curred. 120 Security Council Resolution 713 was unanimously adopted
on September 25, 1991. Expressing "deep concern" about the fighting
in the region, the Security Council found that the continuation of the
situation was a threat to international peace and security, and thus in-
voked the provisions under Chapter VII. The Security Council urged
the parties involved to abide by the terms of the cease-fire agree-
ments1 2 1 and called for "a general and complete embargo on all deliv-
eries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia." '1 22
By the fall of 1991, all parties were violating the cease-fire agree-
ments. In November, the Security Council expressed hope that the Sec-
retary General would endeavor to maintain contacts with the Yugoslav
parties and possibly recommend the establishment of a peacekeeping
force in the republics. 12 3 After two resolutions pronouncing that the sit-
uation in the region was not proper for a peacekeeping operation, the
Council authorized a peacekeeping force (UN Protection Force or UN-
PROFOR) of 13,870 personnel per its authority under Article 25 in
Resolution 743 on February 21, 1992.124
In the meantime, an Arbitration Commission was set up by the
EC in November 1991 to settle territorial issues in addition to other
questions about trade, customs and foreign policy. The Commission
made recommendations to the Community regarding the recognition of
the former Yugoslavian states and found that the new republics should
be given the security of the protections of the UN Charter with respect
to external borders, territorial integrity and political independence.1 2 5
120. Id. at 577.
121. A cease-fire had been negotiated through the auspices of the European Com-
munity (EC) and the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Id. at 579.
122. Id. at 579-80.
123. United Nations Security Council Resolution 721 (Nov. 27, 1991).
124. In United Nations Security Council Resolution 724 (Dec. 15, 1991) and
United Nations Security Council Resolution 727 (Jan. 8, 1992), the Council deter-
mined that, due to the cease-fire violations, the circumstances did not exist for deploy-
ment of a peacekeeping force. Resolution 727 sent fifty military liaison officers to the
region to help support maintenance of the cease-fire. See Weller, supra note 119, at
584.
125. Id. at 589. The EC recognition was based on certain criteria, the most signif-
icant being the renunciation of territorial claims by the new states. After a referendum
in March 1992, where 63% of the population voted for independence, Bosnia-
Hercegovina was recognized by the EC on April 6, 1992. Croatia, pursuant to the
recommendation of the Arbitration Council, was recognized on January 15, 1992. Id.
at 593. Macedonia applied for recognition on December 20, 1991. Out of deference to
member-state Greece's objection to the name of "Macedonia" (also an area in Greece),
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In April 1992, Serbia and Montenegro declared that the republics con-
stituted the successor state to the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.126
In March 1992, the three main ethnic groups in Bosnia and
Hercegovina (hereinafter referred to as Bosnia) released a Statement
of Principles for New Constitutional Arrangements which declared that
the new state would maintain its existing boundaries and would recog-
nize the rights of all of the Muslim, Croat and Serb citizens. Shortly
thereafter, however, the Serb leadership in Bosnia disavowed the State-
ment. 121 Hostilities soon swept throughout Bosnia. After several cease-
fires were broken, the UN Security Council called an emergency meet-
ing. The Council released a statement denouncing the use of force and
demanding that outside parties refrain from interfering in the affairs of
Bosnia. 128
The refugee situation in Croatia, however, propelled the Security
Council into action. By April 1991, over 600,000 refugees, more than
half from Bosnia, had fled into Croatia. After urgings from Croatia
and the other new republics, the Security Council adopted Resolution
752 calling on all parties concerned to assist in the "effective and un-
hindered" delivery of humanitarian assistance to airfields in Bosnia and
demanding that the parties cease their fighting. 2 9 The Security Coun-
cil acted explicitly under Chapter VII in August 1992 when it called
upon states to take "all measures necessary to facilitate" the delivery of
humanitarian assistance to Bosnia and Hercegovina.'
the EC informally recognized the new republic in a declaration of May 1, 1992, despite
Macedonia's repeated renunciation of territorial claims. Id. at 594. Macedonia was
formally recognized by the EC on December 15, 1992. Slovenia requested and received
EC recognition on December 19, 1991. Id. at 594. For an in-depth legal analysis of
secession in former Yugoslavia, see Lawrence S. Eastwood, Jr., Secession: State Prac-
tice and International Law After the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,
3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L. L. 299 (Spring, 1993)[hereinafter Eastwood].
126. Weller, supra note 119, at 595. The intended succession was challenged by
the United States, Japan and almost all of the EC states, as, initially, was the attempt
by the newly proclaimed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to occupy the former Yugo-
slavia's seat at the UN. Id. at 595-96.
127. Id. at 597.
128. Id. at 600. The fact that the Council only authorized a statement from the
President and not a resolution has led some to conclude that Council was unwilling to
obligate itself to more severe enforcement actions. Id. at 601.
129. Id. at 601-2. United Nations Security Council Resolution 752 (May 15,
1992). In response to the failure of the Serb authorities to comply with Resolution 752,
the Council adopted economic sanctions in United Nations Security Council Resolution
-757 (May 30, 1992).
130. United Nations Security Council Resolution 770 (Aug. 13, 1992).
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On August 25, 1992, the UN General Assembly demanded an end
to the fighting in Bosnia, while condemning the massive violations of
human rights and humanitarian law. In addition, the Assembly de-
manded the withdrawal of JNA and Croatian forces from Bosnia. 131
Although the JNA totally withdrew from Bosnia, Bosnia Serb forces,
armed with JNA weaponry and equipment left behind, have come to be
known as the Army of the "Serb Republic." Croatian Army personnel
also remained engaged in the fighting in Bosnia. 132
General Assembly Resolution 46/242 focused on the human rights
violations taking place in Bosnia."'3 The Assembly condemned the
practice of "ethnic cleansing" and demanded that it be stopped. In ad-
dition, the Assembly demanded that the enormous, forcible displace-
ment of the population around Bosnia be ended.134 In recognition of
these humanitarian problems, the General Assembly demanded that
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) be "granted im-
mediate, unimpeded and continued access to all camps, prisons and
other places of detention" in former Yugoslavia as well as ensuring
that the ICRC be allowed free movement throughout that territory in
order to gain access to those facilities.135 Security Council Resolution
787 of November 16, 1992 attempted to address these concerns.
Resolution 787 called for all parties "to cooperate fully with the
humanitarian agencies and with the United Nations Protection Force
to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance" in former Yugo-
slavia. The Council demanded an end to all interference in Bosnia from
131. General Assembly Resolution 46/242 (Aug. 25, 1992).
132. Report of the Secretary General, UN Doc. A/47/747 (Dec. 3, 1992) [here-
inafter A/47/747]. The Assembly's resolution followed Security Council Resolution
771 which reaffirmed that "all parties to the conflict are bound to comply with their
obligations under international humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva Conven-
tions .... " United Nations Security Council Resolution 771 (Aug. 13, 1992).
133. By November 1992, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimated
that there were over 3 million refugees, displaced persons and other victims in former
Yugoslavia who required some form of assistance. A/47/747, supra note 132, at 9.
134. See id. at 6. Shortly thereafter, the Security Council in Resolution 780 re-
quested that the Secretary General establish an impartial Commission of Experts to
make findings with respect to violations of international humanitarian law and breaches
of the Geneva Convention in former Yugoslavia. Id. at 7. In United Nations Security
Council Resolution 798 (Dec. 18, 1992), the Council noted "the massive, organized
and systematic detention and rape of women ... in Bosnia and Herzegovina." In light
of the reports of the rapes, "mass killings, . . . [and] 'ethnic cleansing'" in Bosnia, the
Council decided to "establish an international tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecut-
ing persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law ... in
former Yugoslavia." United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 (May 25, 1993).
135. See A/47/747, supra note 132, at 6.
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outside parties. In addition, the Council, acting under Chapters VI and
VII, called upon states to "halt all inward and outward maritime ship-
ping" for inspections and verification of cargo and took steps to restrict
the diversion of embargoed commodities to Serbia and Montenegro.' "
The Security Council soon began to take measures in order to en-
sure that the humanitarian assistance was delivered to those in need. In
Resolution 781, the Council "established a ban on military flights in
the airspace of Bosnia," excepting, of course, UN flights in support of
the humanitarian assistance operations. In response, the United States,
France and the Netherlands deployed aircraft in October 1992 to en-
sure that the ban was observed.1'3 Due to the numerous violations of
the ban,13 8 the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Char-
ter extended the ban to "all fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the
airspace" of Bosnia. 39 In addition, paragraph 4 of Resolution 816
"[ajuthorize[d] Member States . . . acting nationally or through re-
gional organizations or arrangements, to take . . . all necessary mea-
sures in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the
event of further violations, to ensure compliance with the ban on
flights."' 0
An additional undertaking to facilitate the delivery of humanita-
rian assistance was the development of "safe areas." Faced with havoc
in the face of widespread fighting in Srebrenica, "'I the Council in Reso-
lution 819 demanded that "all parties . . . concerned treat Srebrenica
and its surroundings as a safe area which should be free from any
armed attack or any other hostile act."'4 2 The Council again demanded
the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to Bosnia and de-
manded that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia "immediately cease
the supply of military arms, equipment and services to the Bosnian
Serb paramilitary units" in Bosnia.4 In May 1992, Resolution 824
136. United Nations Security Council Resolution 787 (Nov. 16, 1992).
137. 30 UN CHRONICLE, Sept. 1993 at 16 [hereinafter UN CHRONICLE].
138. 125 flights in violation of the ban were reported from April 1 to June 30,
1992, bringing the total at the time to 624 violations. Id.
139. United Nations Security Council Resolution 816 (Mar. 31, 1993).
140. Id.
141. The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights reported
"massive and repeated" violations of the 1949 Geneva Conventions in former Yugosla-
via. The violations included attacks on civilians, refusal to allow humanitarian aid to
the needy and denial of evacuation of any wounded persons. S/258792 of 10 May
1993.
142. United Nations Security Council Resolution 819 (Apr. 16, 1993).
143. The next day the Security Council strengthened the sanctions against Yugo-
slavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in order to deter the diversion of sanctioned goods. On
1995]
30 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 19
added five additional localities to the list of "safe areas. ' 14 4 The Coun-
cil also declared that it would "consider immediately the adoption of
any additional measures necessary" if parties failed to comply with the
"safe areas" designation."
Reinforcement of the mandate of the UNPROFOR peacekeeping
force was also a method of strengthening the UN's hand in delivery of
aid. UNPROFOR was given the authority, via Resolution 836, to use
force in order to create and maintain safe areas in designated towns." 6
Resolution 836 authorized the peacekeepers to use force to contravene
attacks against the "safe areas" or the "deliberate obstruction" of hu-
manitarian convoys. Member states, acting individually or through re-
gional organizations (such as NATO), were given authority by the
Council to use "all necessary measures," including the use of air power,
to support UNPROFOR. The purpose of the new rules of engagement
was to allow UNPROFOR to prevent attacks in the safe area, monitor
the cease-fire, assist in the withdrawal of non-Bosnian military units
and, overall, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.14" Important
to* the peacekeepers' free movement in the republic was the fact that
the mandate allowed them to occupy strategic positions in the area.
In response to the Security Council's request for reinforcements of
the peacekeeping force, the Council authorized the expansion of UN-
PROFOR personnel." 8 In addition, the mandate of UNPROFOR was
extended and the Council subsequently approved the Secretary-Gen-
eral's request for funds to enhance the peacekeeping force. At present,
UNPROFOR is primarily deployed in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia
April 29, 1993, the Assembly decided that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should
not work on the Economic and Social Council. See UN CHRONICLE, supra note 137, at
12.
144. Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac were declared "safe areas" by the
resolution. See UN CHRONICLE, supra note 137, at 12.
145. On May 25, 1993, the Security Council established an International Tribu-
nal "for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law." The Tribunal will examine "crimes against human-
ity" and war crimes. United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 (May 25, 1993).
146. See UN CHRONICLE, supra note 137, at 14.
147. Id.
148. United Nations Security Council Resolution 844 (June 18, 1993). Earlier,
the Council had requested that the Secretary General deploy international observers to
the border in order to monitor the implementation of sanctions. The Secretary General,
however, reported that limited UN peacekeeping resources made full border control
"unrealistic." UN CHRONICLE, supra note 137, at 18. In addition, the Security Coun-
cil approved the offer of the United States to send peacekeepers to Macedonia in sup-
port of UNPROFOR in United Nations Security Council Resolution 842 (June 18,
1993).
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with a current strength of over 24,000 personnel. " 9
The Security Council in August 1993 reaffirmed its demand for
the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid and continued "safety and
operational effectiveness of UNPROFOR and UNHCR personnel" in
Bosnia. In Resolution 859, the Council once again called for an "imme-
diate cease-fire and cessation of hostilities.' 150 UNPROFOR's mandate
to use force was again expanded in October 1993 in Security Council
Resolution 871 when the peacekeeping force was authorized to use
"self-defense, to take necessary measures, including the use of force, to
ensure its security and its freedom of movement."'' As will be seen in
the foregoing analysis, the peacekeepers in Bosnia have a mandate re-
sembling the ONUC peacekeepers in the Congo operation. This au-
thority and recent events have resulted in a blurring of peacekeeping
"guiding principles" and peace enforcement standards for use of force,
which jeopardizes the safety of the peacekeepers and hampers the ef-
fectiveness of their mission.
B. Legal Analysis
The conflict in the former republics of Yugoslavia seems to touch
upon almost every aspect of peacekeeping and peace enforcement under
UN auspices. All of the basic legal norms associated with the UN
Charter and the use of force come into play in the Yugoslavian civil
war. In many ways, the mandate of UNPROFOR has been shaped by
the experience of its predecessors, especially ONUC. Likewise, the per-
formance of UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia will doubtlessly form
a prototype for successor peacekeeping forces assigned with a mission
that involves the use of force beyond self-defense.
UNPROFOR was originally a peacekeeping operation authorized
by the Security Council to facilitate contacts with the warring parties
in former Yugoslavia and to observe and monitor the cease-fire agree-
ments that were being mediated by the UN and EC negotiators. The
Security Council brought Chapter VII claims against the parties after
making a preliminary determination that the situation was a threat to
international peace and security. 52 It is interesting to note that nearly
149. UN CHRONICLE, supra note 137, at 15-16. See United Nations Security
Council Resolution 847 (June 30, 1993).
150. United Nations Security Council Resolution 859 (Aug. 24, 1993).
151. United Nations Security Council Resolution 871 (Oct. 4, 1993)..
152. See AREND, supra note 3, at 37 where the author characterizes the nature of
international conflict. The situation in Bosnia would initially appear to be a "civil"
conflict in which a state (here former Yugoslavia) is having domestic unrest. A mixed
conflict, however, exists "when there is an outside state . . .providing some form of
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a year of inaction by the Security Council led to the General Assem-
bly's strong condemnation of the human rights violations taking place
in Bosnia in August 1992.15 Although the Assembly did not authorize
or attempt to authorize the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, the
Council was prompted into action by the Assembly's resolution and ul-
timately strengthened UNPROFOR's mandate partly on that basis.
The analysis here is broken up into three sections. The first section
scans the development of the legal norms and "principles," not yet
norms, associated with the use of force and peacekeeping in particular,
which have evolved in the "spectrum of conflict" in former Yugoslavia.
The evolving nature of these norms and the lack of adherence to tradi-
tional "guiding principles" in UNPROFOR's operations has led to a
gradual blending of peacekeeping and peace enforcement actions. The
analysis, therefore, turns to an examination of how the mandate for the
use of force has developed in the Yugoslavian theater, resulting in an
eventual combining of the peacekeeping operation with an enforcement
action. Due to the permissive interpretation of Article 39 by the Secur-
ity Council, it is likely that humanitarian interventions under the aus-
pices of the UN will occur more frequently. The last section of the
analysis will, therefore, examine the legal authority of the UN to em-
power peacekeepers to become peace enforcers during violations of hu-
manitarian law and consider proposals to enhance the safety of the UN
troops and mission accomplishment in the face of these continually
changing operations.
1. The Dynamic Nature of UN Norms and "Guiding Principles"
The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty ... has passed;
its theory was never matched by reality .... The sovereignty,
territorial integrity and independence of States within the es-
tablished international system .. .must not be permitted to
work against each other in the period ahead .... Our constant
duty should be to maintain the integrity of each while finding a
balanced design for all. 1 5
assistance ... to either the government or the rebels in an existing civil conflict." The
conflict in the former Yugoslavia is both a civil and international conflict. Id. The con-
flict in Bosnia, in light of the secession and eventual recognition of the former republics
of Yugoslavia, resembles a mixed conflict, allowing the Security Council greater
breadth to declare this an international threat to peace and security.
153. See G.A. Res. 46/242, supra note 131.
154. Agenda for Peace, supra note 115, at 953.
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The mandate of UNPROFOR has expanded with the need of the
Council to enforce its sanctions and weapons embargo. As noted above,
the Council did not originally suggest that Article 2(4) of the Charter
had been invoked by the earlier conflict in Croatia in September 1991.
By August 1992, however, the "need to respect the . . territorial integ-
rity and political independence" of Bosnia had become the basis for
demanding access to the camps and detention centers for the purpose
of delivering humanitarian aid. 155 The Security Council has seemingly
justified its increasing actions in Bosnia based upon its broader respon-
sibilities under the Charter for protecting the territorial integrity of the
state.
An analysis of a humanitarian intervention, such as in Bosnia, as
it relates to peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, must first
begin with an examination of how the operation has affected the UN
Charter's Article 2(7) prohibition against the United Nations' interven-
ing "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state." As noted above, Article 2(7) expressly does not prejudice
enforcement measures under Chapter VII. Indeed, the development of
human rights law and state practice has helped to significantly trans-
form the original meaning attached to Article 2(7).'"
In some ways, the Council has rationalized its substantial involve-
ment in Bosnia by turning the sovereignty argument around. In many
cases, intrusive Security Council action might be countered by argu-
ments that such action impinges upon a state's domestic jurisdiction or
sovereignty. In Council resolutions regarding former Yugoslavia,
though, several preambles note the reaffirmation of the "sovereignty"
of Bosnia as a reason for Chapter VII action.157 In other words, rather
than seeing its deeds as an intervention into the affairs of Bosnia or
Yugoslavia, the Council characterizes its action as necessary to protect
the Bosnian state's sovereignty from interference of third parties.I While the norm of non-intervention under Article 2(7) has been
diminished by the interventions in Somalia and Iraq, the crisis in Bos-
nia has actually done little to clarify the status of state sovereignty in
situations involving grave violations of humanitarian law. It is impor-
tant to note that the Security Council, frequently reaffirming the "sov-
ereignty" of the Republic of Bosnia, sees itself as responsible for pro-
tecting that state's territorial integrity and political independence,
rather than as intervening in the domestic affairs of a member state. In
155. See United Nations Security Council Resolution 770 (Aug. 13, 1992).
156. See Scheffer, supra note 10, at 262.
157. See eg., United Nations Security Council Resolution 815 (Mar. 30, 1993)
and United Nations Security Council Resolution 819 (Apr. 16, 1993).
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essence, although some states initially saw the UN's involvement in for-
mer Yugoslavia as unwarranted intervention, 158 the issue of Article
2(7) non-intervention was ultimately rendered moot by the request for
Security Council action by the Yugoslav government itself in Septem-
ber 1991.
Successful peacekeeping operations have almost always required
the consent of all local parties involved in the conflict. For example,
UNEF I necessitated the consent and cooperation of all parties -
Egypt, France, Israel and the United Kingdom - to ensure that the
peacekeepers were able to accomplish their goal of securing a cease-fire
and facilitating the withdrawal of foreign troops in the Sinai Peninsula.
Similarly, the Congolese central government's lack of consent, due to
an internal mutiny, had rendered the Security Council unable to agree
on a course of action. 159 In the present conflict in Bosnia, it is impossi-
ble to characterize all of the parties as consenting to all of the Coun-
cil's resolutions, including those which call on the parties to cooperate
with UNPROFOR to promote the delivery of humanitarian aid. The
Serbs, in what remains as Yugoslavia, have been accused of arming the
Bosnian Serbs and interfering with the territorial integrity of Bosnia, as
well as violating the human rights of the Muslims and Croats in the
region.160 The lack of consent and cooperation on the part of the Serbs
and the Bosnian Serbs to the overall mission of the peacekeepers is of
course one of the main reasons for UNPROFOR's deployment in the
first place. The consent and cooperation of all local parties involved in a
conflict is one of the main factors which normally characterizes a
peacekeeping operation. This lack of agreement and cooperation in
Bosnia distinguishes the UNPROFOR mission from traditional
peacekeeping duties and serves to redefine the operation as an enforce-
ment action.161
158. See Weller, supra note 119, at 578-79. China, India, and Cuba all expressed
reservations about discussing action in what was seen as an "internal matter." Id.
159. See AREND, supra note 3, at 96-97. The General Assembly eventually re-
quested the Secretary General to continue "to take vigorous action" in accordance with
earlier Security Council resolutions. The Blue Helmets, supra note 32, at 229.
160. Weller, supra note 119, at 598.
161. The recent strategic planning between the UN Secretary General and
NATO forces regarding the use of air power in Bosnia, to achieve the replacement of
Canadian peacekeepers with Dutch troops in the face of Bosnian Serb dissent, has led
to the drafting of three possible scenarios. The options all revolve around the "consent
of the parties." For instance, the first option envisages the "achievement" of the troop
replacement with the consent of the Bosnian Serbs and, thus, no need for air power.
The other two scenarios assume lack of consent. See S-G Presents Options for Use of
Air Power in Bosnia, Delegates Authority to Akashi, INT'L DOCUMENTS REV., Jan. 31,
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A closely related ingredient for successful peacekeeping is the
maintenance of impartiality or neutrality by the United Nations.
Again, the UN's neutral role in the UNEF I operation allowed the
peacekeepers to work effectively with both the Egyptians and Israelis in
an extremely delicate situation. When the ONUC peacekeepers took on
a generally partial position by assuming law enforcement duties in the
Congo on behalf of the central government, the result was attacks on
the force by tribesmen or separatist groups, which could have seriously
jeopardized the future of the operation. In former Yugoslavia, the Se-
curity Council has particularly condemned the Bosnian Serb paramili-
tary forces for failing to comply with Council resolutions. " In addi-
tion, the Council and Assembly have both repeatedly demanded that
the JNA be withdrawn from Bosnia.' Recently, the Security Council
sought to show the Bosnian Serbs that UN member states were fully
determined to use force in the nature of air strikes if the Serbs did not
remove their heavy artillery from the area surrounding Sarajevo. 1 4
In fact, events in the conflict have led to a tilt by the Council
towards the protection of the Croatian and Muslim populations in Bos-
nia. Although there were no reported purposeful attacks on the UN-
PROFOR forces by the Serb forces until recently, there were
peacekeepers killed by the indiscriminate shelling in Bosnia. 165 The re-
cent bombings of Serb positions by NATO aircraft heightens the po-
tential for attacks on the UNPROFOR forces if the Serbs feel that
they are being singled out as the aggressors in the conflict. 6 ' The polit-
1994 at 6.
162. See United Nations Security Council Resolution 787 (Nov. 16, 1992).
163. See U.N. Doc. A/47/747, supra note 132.
164. Paul Lewis "West, at U.N., Warns Serbs of Its Resolve to Use Force," N. Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1994, at A12.
165. Accusing the UN of favoring the Muslim-led government in Bosnia, the Bos-
nian Serb forces recently took nearly 150 peacekeepers as hostages. Alison Smale,
Serbs Shown Triumphant Over UN, Associated Press/AP Online, Apr. 19, 1994.
166. Carol J. Williams, Defiant Serbs Harden Stance, Los ANGELES TIMES, Apr.
13, 1994, at AA1. [hereinafter Williams], where ,it is reported that the Bosnian Serbs
have announced that they are "laying mines to trap U.N. peacekeepers" and have kid-
napped a Dutch observer. The Bosnian Serbs, after the NATO bombing "warned that
the U.N. Protection Force is now considered an enemy." Id.
In addition, Turkey recently announced that it would be sending 2,700 troops to
Bosnia as part of UNPROFOR. 2,700 Turkish Troops for Bosnia, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Mar. 24, 1994. Almost immediately, Bosnian Serb leaders complained that the
Turkish troops in Bosnia would lead to "dangerous consequences" due to Turkey "not
maintain[ing] a neutral position toward the civil war in Bosnia." Momcilo Krajisnik,
quoted in Serbs Warn of "Danger" of Turkish Presence, UN Troops Attacked,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 26, 1994.
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ically sensitive consequences in the participating member states result-
ing from increased casualties among the peacekeepers would certainly
imperil the future of the operation. Again, the perception that the UN
might be biased in Bosnia toward one side or the other counters the
traditional "guiding principles" for peacekeeping missions and is fur-
ther evidence that the conflict has blurred into a peace enforcement
action.
A third important component for a successful peacekeeping opera-
tion is broad political support, especially among the permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council. 6 ' UNEF I again presents a model for a
successful peacekeeping mission that endured due to superpower con-
sensus that a larger conflict involving the US and Soviet Union must be
avoided. Although the end of the Cold War has signalled greater coop-
eration among the permanent members of the Council, especially with
the Russians, domestic political agendas may once again control events.
The Russians, traditional allies of the Serbs, have reacted to increasing
Russian nationalism by warning the Security Council not to take action
without their being consulted first.'68 The recent NATO airstrike re-
newed Russian objections and led to claims by Russian officials that the
action has "imperil[ed] Russia's prospective links with the Western al-
lies."" 9 The potential lack of political cooperation by the Russians,
permanent members of the Security Council with a veto and strategic
participants in the peacekeeping force, could doom the UN's future
collective efforts to maintain peace and security in the region.
As UN peacekeepers are sent into missions like former Yugosla-
via, where they take on more partisan and aggressive roles, it is foresee-
able that they will encounter greater adversity and perform non-tradi-
tional peacekeeping duties. The gradual weakening of customary UN
Charter norms and the abandonment of traditional "guiding princi-
ples" in UN peacekeeping operations does not, of course, signal the end
of effective UN collective security action. The trends, however, have
led to a blurring of the distinction between the functions of
167. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the Great Powers in United Nations
Peace-Keeping, 18 YALE J. OF INT'L. L. 429 (1993).
168. Russia, for example, "is categorically opposed to the use of air power to
change the strategic position of the parties to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina."
NATO Threat of Air Strikes Seeks to Force Sarajevo Heavy Weapons Under UN
Control, INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS REVIEW, Feb. 14, 1994 at 1. An example of
potential decreased political support outside of the Security Council is the Greek reac-
tion to the deployment of Turkish troops to Bosnia. See e.g., Greece Upset at Turkey
Involvement in UNPROFOR, The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, Mar. 24,
1994.
169. Williams, supra note 166, at p. 1.
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peacekeepers and peace enforcers, and raises the issue of where, if at
all, the line should be drawn between the two.
2. The Blurring Mandate for the Use of Force
Depending upon the nature of the situation, different configura-
tions and compositions of security deployments will need to be
considered. As the variety and scale of the threat widens, inno-
vative measures will be required to deal with the dangers facing
United Nations personnel. 170
The authority of the peacekeepers in former Yugoslavia to use
force has altered as the mission and the mandate of UNPROFOR has
changed. The initial deployment of the UNPROFOR forces impliedly
carried with it the authority to use force in self-defense for the safety
of the troops."" The safety of UNPROFOR troops later became a spe-
cific concern of the Security Council, which began to demand "that the
safety and operational effectiveness of UNPROFOR ... personnel...
be fully respected by all parties at all times."1 72 As noted above, the
Council in Resolution 871 explicitly authorized the use of force by the
peacekeepers in order to guarantee their "security and freedom of
movement." The importance of UNPROFOR's "freedom of move-
ment" is closely related to their ability to ensure compliance with reso-
lutions demanding "the unhindered flow of humanitarian assistance"
and strengthen their self-defense mandate. Reminiscent of the dilemma
of the Congo operation, the peacekeeper's mandate to use force for self-
defense in Bosnia is greatly expanded by their authority to secure "free
movement," thereby facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid. 17
The enlarged role which self-defense now plays in peacekeeping opera-
tions appears to have been endorsed by the Secretary General in his
Agenda for Peace, where he speaks of the need for "innovative mea-
sures . . . required to deal with the dangers facing United Nations
170. Agenda for Peace, supra note 115, at para. 66.
171. See Schachter, supra note 23, at 84.
172. See United Nations Security Council Resolution 859 (Aug. 24, 1993).
173. The "freedom of movement" mandate expressed in United Nations Security
Council Resolution 836 (June 4, 1993), was presumably to ensure the safety of the
UNPROFOR troops and to enhance their self-defense capabilities. Heightened concern
for the safety of the peacekeepers has been generated by confusion over command and
control and rule of engagement issues. See Jeane Kirkpatrick, Peacekeeper's Lives in
Danger, THE WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 21, 1994 at A19.
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personnel. ' 17 4
Another parallel with the Congo peacekeeping operation is the po-
tential for the use of force to expel outside troops. Resolution 787 ex-
presses the Council's frustration with these forces, where the Council
demands "that all forms of interference from outside the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzcegovina, including infiltration into the country of ir-
regular units and personnel, cease immediately." The Council "reaf-
firm[ed] its determination to take measures against all parties and
others concerned which fail to fulfill the requirements of Resolution
752 ... including the requirement that all forces ... be withdrawn. '175
Although the Council has not authorized the use of force to expel
outside troops, presumably that is one of the options that is contem-
plated by the use of the term "take measures."
The most visible examples of UNPROFOR's enforcement author-
ity are contained in three Security Council resolutions: Resolution 770
and subsequent resolutions, providing that "all necessary measures" be
used to deliver humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and other areas as
needed; Resolution 816, creating a no-fly zone and the authority to en-
force the ban;176 and Resolution 836, mandating the protection of "safe
areas" through the use of air power if necessary. Some commentators
note that these resolutions would not require any further authorization
in order to use force.177
The authority in these resolutions to use force ostensibly outside of
the realm of self-defense has not been without controversy or debate.7
In January 1994, when Sarajevo and other "safe areas" in Bosnia were
severely threatened, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali reaf-
firmed the "readiness" of the UN to carry out airstrikes to support the
operation in Bosnia. 7 9 In a letter to the Security Council, the Secre-
tary General stated that "[tihe idea of using air power to support a
174. Agenda for Peace, supra note 115, at para. 66.
175. United Nations Security Council Resolution 787 (Nov. 16, 1992).
176. On February 28, 1994, NATO warplanes in support of Security Council
Resolution 816, shot down four Bosnian Serb bombers that were violating the no-fly
zone. Abner Katzman, Serbia Asks World Court to Rule NATO Threat of Force Ille-
gal, Associated Press, AP Worldstream, Mar. 23, 1994.
177. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 173.
178. See, e.g., Serbia Asks World Court to Rule NATO Threat of Force Illegal,
Associated Press, AP Worldstream, Mar. 23, 1994 supra note 176. Serbia, in response
to threats of air strikes from NATO, has asked the International Court of Justice to
rule that such threat of force is illegal and contrary to the UN Charter. Serbia con-
tends that NATO's ultimatum is "inconsistent" with UN purposes. Id.
179. See Bosnia Air Strikes Would Entail More Military Assets on the Ground,
S-G Tells Council, INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS REVIEW, Jan. 24, 1994 at 7.
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military operation . . . gives rise to issues which do not arise in the
context of air support for the defence of UN personnel." 180 In other
words, the Secretary General was pointing out the distinction between
"launch[ing] offensive action against Bosnian Serb elements which ob-
structed - or threatened to obstruct - UNPROFOR's military opera-
tions" and the defensive operations normally associated with such
peacekeeping operations."8 ' Responding to concerns from the Russians,
Boutros-Ghali later clarified the distinction between close air support
for self-defense and the use of air power for preemptive or punitive
purposes. 182
With respect to political support from member nations, issues have
arisen as to who has authority to order air strikes. When Secretary
General Boutros-Ghali delegated the authority to approve requests for
close air support to the UNPROFOR commander for self-defense pur-
poses, it became necessary for him to note that "aggressive air strikes"
could only be initiated by NATO and the North Atlantic Council.'
The UN Charter and the Security Council, of course, do not provide
for the Secretary General's approval or authority in military enforce-
ment actions. This blurring of the rules of engagement in Bosnia has
coincided with the expansion of the peacekeeper's mission. A former
U.S. ambassador to the UN argues that the UNPROFOR forces have
been put into jeopardy by the redefinition of peacekeeping, which sends
the troops into dangerous combat zones without sufficient armament.18 4
The ability of peacekeepers to fulfill their mission and, as noted above,
the continued political support of participating nations, will greatly de-
pend upon the ability of the UN to create, execute, and modify, the
rules of engagement surrounding peacekeepers' use of force as the situ-
ation demands.
180. Letter from Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the United Na-
tions, to Karel Kovanda, President of the Security Council. (Jan. 18, 1994), reprinted
in part in INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS REVIEW, supra note 161.
181. Id. The Secretary General noted that air power, potentially helpful in a mili-
tary operation to open the airfield at Tuzla, would not alone be able to "achieve the
desired objectives." More military assets in Srebrenica and Tuzla would be required.
Id.
182. Letter from Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the United Na-
tions, to Karel Kovanda, President of the Security Council. (Jan. 28, 1994), reprinted
in part in INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS REVIEW, Jan. 31, 1994 at 6.
183. See INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS REVIEW, Feb. 14, 1994, at 2.
184. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 173.
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3. Humanitarian Diplomacy - The Future of Peacekeeping and
Peacemaking Operations
Providing succour to the victims of conflict through the effec-
tive relief programmes can positively assist peacemaking efforts
... I see a dynamic link between peacemaking, peace-keeping
and humanitarian assistance, constituting the essence of hu-
manitarian diplomacy.185
Enforcement actions under Chapter VII are clearly legal and the
use of force authorized by the Security Council for such purposes is
lawful. All of the use of force measures authorized in the conflict in
Bosnia noted above are explicit Chapter VII actions. As such, the mea-
sures fall into the exception of the last sentence of Article 2(7) relating
to Chapter VII enforcement actions.
Due to the increasing frequency with which the Security Council
has initiated Chapter VII action on the basis of humanitarian viola-
tions, it is worthwhile examining the status of interventions for humani-
tarian purposes in light of the UN action in Bosnia. It has been argued
that "genuine instances of humanitarian intervention have been rare, if
they have occurred at all."18 Commentators point to the intervenor's
non-humanitarian interest or motives, or other political or economic
considerations involved, in addition to the fact that no intervening state
has used the pure rationale of humanitarian intervention to justify its
use of force. 187 While this theory appears to be challenged particularly
by the intervention in Somalia, the crisis in Bosnia and the UN's reac-
tion there cannot be described as solely a humanitarian crisis. The gen-
eral interest in protecting that state's territorial integrity and the politi-
cal fear that the conflict might spill over into Greece and Turkey have
185. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Report on the Work of the Organization from the
Forty-Sixth to the Forty-Seventh Session of the General Assembly 62 (1992). Bout-
ros-Ghali defined peacemaking as "action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essen-
tially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of
the United Nations." Agenda for Peace, supra note 115, at para. 20. "Peace enforce-
ment," envisioned as a sub-division of peacemaking under Chapter VII, is where the
"United Nations has sometimes been called upon to send forces to restore and maintain
the cease-fire" and to "enforce the agreed-on mandate." Id. at para. 44. See James B.
Steinberg, International Involvement in the Yugoslavia Conflict, in ENFORCING RE-
STRAINT 27, 63 (Lori Fisler Damrosch, ed., 1993)[hereinafter Steinberg].
186. AREND, supra note 3, at 135.
187. Id. quoting Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention, in THE CURRENT LEGAL
REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE (A. Cassesse, ed., 1986).
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also been rationales for intervening in Bosnia.188 Nevertheless, the
plight in Bosnia and the other former Yugoslav republics can be char-
acterized as a predominately humanitarian disaster which has required
Chapter VII action by the UN.
The determination that the crisis in the former Yugoslav republics
was in fact more than an "internal affair" allowed the Security Council
in Resolution 713 to declare that the "continuation of this situation
constitutes a threat to international peace and security." This precur-
sory decision would, of course, be necessary in order to evoke Article 39
and Chapter VII enforcement actions. 18 The Council, in several reso-
lutions, defined the bases for such a threat: the transboundary effects of
the refugee situation in Bosnia, 190 the inability to deliver humanitarian
aid due to the civil war,"9 "ethnic cleansing" and other violations of
humanitarian law. 92 The findings that these circumstances were the
bases for a threat to international peace and security are grounded in
the recognition that the external refugee problem and the internal
"grave and systematic" humanitarian violations both warranted Chap-
ter VII action.
The question then becomes whether the internal human rights sit-
uation in Bosnia would by itself trigger Article 39.193 At this stage, due
to the multi-faceted threats to international peace resulting from this
"mixed conflict,"' 94 one can only speculate as to how the Security
Council would have reacted in Bosnia had the crisis been purely inter-
nal.195 The reports of "ethnic cleansing" and "massive, organized and
188. See MALANCZUK, supra note 113, at 22.
189. Curiously, the Council, without expressly determining that a threat to inter-
national peace and security existed, employed Chapter VII to implement a weapons
embargo in Yugoslavia. See Security Council Resolution 713 (Sept. 25, 1993). The
Council made an express determination in Resolution 757 that the international peace
and security were threatened.
190. See United Nations Security Council Resolution 757 (May 30, 1992).
191. See United Nations Security Council Resolution 770 (Aug. 13, 1992).
192. See United Nations Security Council Resolution 771 (Aug. 13, 1992).
193. See MALANCZUK, supra note 113, at 23-24, where the author concludes that
the threat to peace in Yugoslavia is not primarily based on the internal human rights
situation but on "the consequences of the conflict for neighboring states." But see Jost
Delbruck, A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention under the Authority of the
United Nations, 67 IND. L. J. 887 (1992) [hereinafter Delbruck II], where the author
argues that a threat to the peace under Article 39 should include purely internal
situations.
194. See supra note 152.
195. The primary ground in the humanitarian intervention in Iraq to protect the
Kurds was the "threat to regional stability caused by cross-border refugee flows."
Michael Stopford, Humanitarian Assistance in the Wake of the Persian Gulf War, 33
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systematic detention and rape of women" '196 certainly makes a compel-
ling case for UN action. In any event, although the principle of human-
itarian intervention for the purpose of preventing these violations is not
yet recognized as a formal legal exception to the Article 2(4) prohibi-
tion against the use of force, the practice of the UN in triggering
Chapter VII action is clearly legal and presents strong evidence of
emerging customary law.
The increased prospect of UN humanitarian diplomacy of this
type will potentially increase the number of peace enforcement opera-
tions which are originally established as intended peacekeeping efforts.
It is entirely foreseeable that peacekeepers in the future will find their
safety threatened as their mission evolves into an enforcement action
requiring more complex and refined rules of engagement. The fading
distinction between the level of force used by peacekeepers and peace
enforcers is potentially disastrous when considered in light of their sep-
arate training and equipment needs, as well as their distinct operational
and logistical planning structure. This anomaly, however, is curable
through better organizational structuring at the UN and the creation
of a better-trained, highly professional peacekeeping corps that is flexi-
ble enough to respond to the many diverse situations in which
peacekeepers find themselves today.
Ironically, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali seemed to recognize
this dilemma in Agenda For Peace when he wrote about the need for
the Security Council to consider "advance collective measures," partic-
ularly when the "purposes of the United Nations operation [are] sys-
tematically ...frustrated and hostilities occur. ' 197 Along these lines,
efforts to reform the structure of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy
began in 1992.
Traditionally, peacekeeping operations were managed by the Of-
fice of Special Political Affairs. The organization was administered by
two Under-Secretaries General (USG), who both reported to the Sec-
retary General. One USG managed field operations and mediation ef-
forts associated with peace enforcement, while the other was a political
troubleshooter for the Secretary General. Eventually, the peacemaking
VA. J. INT'L L. 491, 492 (1993) (citation omitted). But see Jane E. Stromseth, Iraq's
Repression of Its Civilian Population: Collective Responses and Continuing Chal-
lenges, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT 77, 87 (Lori Fisler Damrosch, ed., 1993), where the
author notes that Britain and France argued that Iraq's violation of its own populations
human rights was a basis for supporting the resolution authorizing humanitarian
assistance.
196. United Nations Security Council Resolution 798 (Dec. 18, 1992).
197. Agenda For Peace, supra note 115, at para. 68.
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functions were transferred to the Secretary General's Executive Office,
resulting in a complete separation of planning from political issues.
This structure reflected the clear distinction between peacekeepers and
peace enforcers in the UN organization. This arose from the traditional
UN view that peace enforcers, who receive military training, and
peacekeepers, who are trained for non-violent responses to provocation,
should be kept separate.19
The staff of the Office of Special Political Affairs which oversaw
Peacekeeping Operations, adequate before the end of the Cold War,
soon found itself stretched beyond its capacity. A comprehensive UN
restructuring in 1992 included the creation of an Office of Peacekeep-
ing Operations as one of four designated departments which would re-
port directly to the Secretary General. While the revised structure
streamlined the peacekeeping administration, there was still no formal
relationship between peacekeepers and peacemakers.1 99 For example,
planners of operations were still separated from, and had no duty to
consult with, logisticians. A standing committee, Senior Planning and
Monitoring Group, was also established to improve communication and
coordination between the "negotiators and [the] operators." This re-
structuring, however, has not linked "the people who understand the
needs and priorities of the contending parties, and the people who un-
derstand the needs, costs, and limits of a field mission. 2 00 Greater inte-
gration of the UN's peacekeeping and peace enforcement resources
must be pursued in order to improve the training and supply of appro-
priate intervenors, as well as their operational efficiency in an ever-
changing environment.
Along these lines, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's suggestion of
a formation of "peace enforcement units," peacekeepers and peace en-
forcers who are properly trained and equipped to respond to crises on
short notice, is a step in the right direction. The Secretary General
visualized an intermediate force which would "bridge the gap between
lightly armed UN peacekeeping forces and full scale UN fighting
198. William J. Durch, Running the Show: Planning and Implementation, in THE
EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING 59, 73-74 (William J. Durch ed., 1993).
199. Id. at 62.
200. Id. See Indar Jit Rikhye, Strengthening UN Peacekeeping: New Challenges
and Proposals, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE 38. Major General Rikhye argues
that the Office of the Secretary General would be best strengthened by streamlining
existing structures so that the Secretary General is better advised. He contends that the
three separate functions (political, military and administrative) should be restructured
from within. For instance, the military adviser's office should be further divided into
planning, operations and training. Id.
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forces that have never been deployed."20 '
With "extensive preparatory training within their national
forces, 20 2 the force should be adaptable enough to quickly deploy
under a variety of circumstances, with a "variable use of force" man-
date. In effect, the "peace-enforcement units" would be a professional
quick-response force which could respond to operations along the full
"spectrum of conflict."
In addition, experts have also called for greater cooperation be-
tween the UN and regional organizations in order to improve organiza-
tional support, equipment, logistics, technical support services and fi-
nancing of operations.2 0 3 However, additional restructuring of the UN
bureaucracy and efforts to create a professional and adaptable
peacekeeping force must continue. As the missions become blurred and
conventional peacekeeping forces gradually become engaged in more
aggressive Chapter VII actions, training, equipment needs, command
structures and rules of engagement on the use of force must all be im-
proved to reflect the changing nature of peacekeeping. 20
VI. CONCLUSION
Following the end of the Cold War, the UN developed new roles
concerning its peacekeeping efforts. Unfortunately, the UN Secretary
General and the Security Council are not adhering to the "guiding
principles" which had been essential for success in previous peacekeep-
ing operations. Military-style enforcement actions such as the humani-
tarian interventions in Somalia and Iraq, and situations like Bosnia,
where a traditional peacekeeping mission involves an escalating use of
force, must be anticipated. Ironically, the dilemma with which UN
peacekeeping is faced is actually a by-product of the Cold War and the
historical anomaly which created peacekeeping in the first place - the
failure to create "special agreements" and a collective security regime
201. Andrew S. Miller, Universal Soldiers: U.N. Standing Armies and the Legal
Alternatives, 81 GEO. L.J. 773, 790 (1993).
202. Agenda for Peace, supra note 115, at para. 44.
203. Rikhye, supra note 200, at 34-35.
204. See Brian Urquhart, the UN and International Security After the Cold War,
in UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD 81 (Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury, eds.,
2nd ed. 1993), where the former Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs
points out the dilemma of the UN peacekeeper's success - the limited capacity of the
UN to undertake an increasing number of operations with its present limited resources.
The author proposes "new criterion for intervention and rules of engagement" and
more highly developed staff, training, planning and command structures, primarily
through the execution of Article 43 agreements. Id. at 92-96.
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in the early days of the UN. In the end, the Security Council must
either raise the threshold for considering whether appropriate condi-
tions for peacekeeping exist,105 or devise formal rules of engagement for
peacekeepers which are sufficiently tailored to the dynamic "spectrum
of conflict" to which the forces are sent.
In former Yugoslavia, the Security Council has repeatedly justi-
fied Chapter VII action through the reaffirmation of the "sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence" of Bosnia. In reality,
however, these norms have weakened with time. The growing body of
human rights law and the developing practice of the UN Security
Council's Article 39 determinations in Iraq, Somalia and Bosnia all
point to an emerging customary norm of UN humanitarian interven-
tion in member states where the humanitarian violations are severe and
have the slightest transboundary effect. As the Security Council liber-
alizes the finding of "threat to the peace" to include non-military
threats, the likelihood of future humanitarian interventions will also in-
crease. The Council must thus either maintain a neutral role with con-
sent of parties to the conflict in future peacekeeping operations, or be
prepared to encounter increasing threats to the safety of its
peacekeepers and be ready to exercise a level of force beyond the tradi-
tional legal meaning of self-defense.
In the final analysis, peacekeeping and peace enforcement are le-
gal UN actions carried out only with the political support of the great
powers who sit as permanent members on the Security Council. To
maintain peacekeeping as a viable, effective tool, it will be necessary
for the UN, through the Security Council and the Secretary General,
to adhere to the traditional "guiding principles" which were success-
fully used by the initial peacekeeping forces in the 1950's. However,
events such as the recent bombing of Serb positions by NATO aircraft
- with the Russians complaining about the proper authority for the
airstrike and the Bosnian Serbs criticizing the UN for being biased -
reinforce the conclusion that the humanitarian assistance operations
can quickly become peace enforcement actions requiring new rules of
engagement. 06
With respect to the peacekeepers in Bosnia and their predecessors
205. See United Nations Security Council Resolutions 724 and 727, supra note
124, where the Council agreed with the Secretary General that conditions, particularly
the failure of the parties to adhere to a cease-fire, did not exist to establish a
peacekeeping force in Yugoslavia.
206. See Yugoslav Government Statement: UN Has Become Directly Involved in
the War, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Apr. 13, 1994, Pt. 2 (Central Europe
and the Balkans).
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in the Congo, difficult issues arise because such missions are poorly de-
fined and there is unclear authority for the use of force .2 0 What is an
acceptable level of force consistent with "all necessary measures" that
UNPROFOR can use to deliver the aid to those in need? Can the
peacekeepers use force in "anticipatory" self-defense when bombard-
ments of "safe areas" or humanitarian convoys en route to a "safe
area" are foreseeable? At what stage does a UNPROFOR request for
air strikes transcend the fine line between close air support for self-
defense and offensive strategic operations? As peacekeeping operations,
such as the one in former Yugoslavia, gradually and progressively
evolve into peace enforcement operations, the rules of engagement and
the authority for the use of force must also be modified and articulately
enunciated. The UN and its Secretary-General have seemingly recog-
nized the dilemma. Current efforts to revise the structure of UN
peacekeeping and peace enforcement organizations and to develop
"peace-enforcement units" are a good start. The stakes, however, are
high. The safety of the peacekeepers, the continued viability of the
United Nations collective security structure and the maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security in future operations will all depend upon
the ability of the UN to respond to this challenge.
207. The Clinton administration has recently introduced very stringent guidelines
for future participation in international peacekeeping operations. The United States
will only participate when there have been grave threats to international peace and
security, major disasters which require relief, or "gross violations" of human rights. In
addition, once the US has decided to take action, it will then determine whether to
send troops or to merely assist in paying for the operation. See U.S. Eyes New Criteria
for Peacekeeping Missions, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Jan. 30, 94 at 35. The Administra-
tion will also decide whether to participate based on the willingness of other nations to
join the operation. US troops would most likely be under US command in most cases as
well. Id.
